N33224 accident

NTSB ERA11CA047 · 2010-10-28 · Bedford, KY

Docket — crew, injuries and powerplant

Summary

The pilot stated that he filled the airplane's fuel tanks with full fuel prior to departing on the cross-country flight. Approximately 30 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 3,000 feet above ground level, the engine suddenly stopped producing power. The pilot checked the fuel mixture and fuel selector settings and attempted to restore engine power but was unsuccessful. He maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a field and landed with the gear in the retracted position, resulting in substantial damage to the airplane's fuselage. Postaccident examination of the engine compartment by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed that the flexible fuel hose that connects to the inlet fitting of the servo fuel injector was separated from the inlet fitting. No damage to any portion of the fitting or to the B-nut, or to the threads of the fitting or B-nut was noted, and there was no evidence of torque seal putty on the B-nut. There was no provision for safety wire to secure the B-nut. The most recent annual inspection was performed approximately 7 flight hours since the inspection. The mechanic who performed the annual inspection stated to an FAA inspector that he did remove the separated line during the inspection to gain access to the fuel inlet screen. He further stated that about the time of the inspection he incorporated a process of applying purple colored torque seal putty on components that he disassembled or removed.

Full narrative

The pilot stated that he topped off the airplane's fuel tanks prior to departing on the cross country flight. Approximately 30 minutes into the flight, at an altitude of 3,000 feet, the engine suddenly "stopped producing power." The pilot checked the fuel mixture and fuel selector settings and attempted to restore engine power, but was unsuccessful. He maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a field and landed gear-up, resulting in substantial damage to the airplane's fuselage. Post-accident examination of the engine compartment by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed that the flexible fuel hose that connects to the inlet fitting of the servo fuel injector was separated from the inlet fitting. No damage to any portion of the fitting or to the B-nut, or to the threads of the fitting or B-nut was noted, and there was no evidence of torque seal putty on the B-nut. There was no provision for safety wire to secure the B-nut. The most recent annual inspection was performed on June 14, 2010, and the airplane had been operated approximately 7 hours since the inspection. The mechanic who performed the annual inspection stated to an FAA inspector that he did remove the separated line during the inspection to gain access to the fuel inlet screen. He further stated that about the time of the inspection, he incorporated a process of applying purple colored torque seal putty on components that he disassembled or removed.

Probable cause

The mechanic's failure to properly secure a fuel line when it was reinstalled during an engine inspection. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident.

Circumstances

Event type
Accident
Highest injury
None
Weather conditions
Visual Meteorological Cond
Light condition
Day
Sky condition
NONE
Ceiling (ft)
0
Visibility (sm)
10
Wind direction
310
Wind speed (kt)
13
Temperature (F)
54
Distance from field
0.0

Aircraft

RegistrationMakeModelDamageFAR part
N33224 — — SUBS 091

Sequence of events

#OccurrencePhase
1 Enroute-cruise Loss of engine power (total) defining Climb
2 Emergency descent Off-field or emergency landing Descent

Findings

Finding
Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Fuel system-Fuel distribution-Incorrect service/maintenance cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Maintenance-Scheduled/routine maintenance-Maintenance personnel cause