N904VJ Douglas DC-9-32 accident

NTSB DCA96MA054 · 1996-05-11 · MIAMI, FL · near MIA

Docket — crew, injuries and powerplant

Summary

The airplane crashed into the Everglades about 10 minutes after takeoff from Miami International Airport. Safety issues discussed in the Board's report include minimization of the hazards posed by fires in class D cargo compartments; equipment, training, and procedures for addressing in-flight smoke and fire aboard air carrier airplanes; guidance for handling of chemical oxygen generators and other hazardous aircraft components; SabreTech's and ValuJet's procedures for handling company materials and hazardous materials; ValuJet's oversight of its contract heavy maintenance facilities; FAA's oversight of ValuJet and ValuJet's contract maintenance facilities; FAA's and the Research and Special Programs Administration's (RSPA) hazardous materials program and undeclared hazardous materials in the U.S. mail; and ValuJet's procedures for boarding and accounting for lap children. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the FAA, RSPA, the U.S. Postal Service, and the Air Transport Association. (See NTSB Report AAR-97/06)

Full narrative

Please refer to the National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB/AAR-97/06, DCA96MA054, for information about this accident.

Probable cause

which resulted from a fire in the airplane's class D cargo compartment that was initiated by the actuation of one or more oxygen generators being improperly carried as cargo, were (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, and identify unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in class D cargo compartments. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet's heavy maintenance programs and responsibilities, including ValuJet's oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech's repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and ValuJet's failure to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance facility employees were aware of the carrier's 'no-carry' hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training. (NTSB Report AAR-97/06) The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident.

Circumstances

Event type
Accident
Highest injury
Fatal
Weather conditions
Visual Meteorological Cond
Light condition
Day
Sky condition
NONE
Ceiling (ft)
0
Visibility (sm)
12
Wind direction
100
Wind speed (kt)
8
Temperature (F)
84
Nearest airport
MIAMI INTL
Distance from field
18.0

Aircraft

RegistrationMakeModelDamageFAR part
N904VJ Douglas DC-9-32 DEST 121

Sequence of events

#OccurrencePhase
1 171 Cruise
2 250 Cruise
3 230 Cruise

Findings

Finding
17117 cause
17116 cause
12410 cause
12605 cause
10002
24100 cause
80000 cause
91000 cause