HB-JHD accident

NTSB DCA24FA164 · 2024-04-17 · Queens, NY · near JFK

Docket — crew, injuries and powerplant

Summary

This incident occurred when Swiss International Air Lines flight 17K (SWR17K), an Airbus A330343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, after four aircraft were cleared to cross the runway during its takeoff roll. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432ER, Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737 MAX 8. SWR17K rejected the takeoff at about 50 knots, when three aircraft entered runway 4L and a fourth was nearing the edge of the runway; the nearest aircraft (DAL29) was traveling at 14 knots and was about 4,692 feet away from SWR17K at the time of the rejected takeoff. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. LC2 cleared an airplane for takeoff and instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L. LC2 subsequently directed LC1 to cross awaiting aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at intersections Yankee Alpha (YA), Golf (G), Fox (F), Hotel (H), to which the LC1 replied roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each. Subsequently the LC1 began to issue sequential instructions for four aircraft (DAL29, AAL2246, RPA5752, DAL420) to cross runway 4L at these four intersections. At 1645:50, SWR17K was cleared for takeoff. SWR17K began its takeoff roll as the four aircraft were approaching the taxiway intersections with runway 4L. At 1646:15, SWR17K rejected the takeoff at approximately 50 knots, reporting traffic on the runway. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. The standard operating procedures (SOP) at JFK allowed for simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections. Furthermore, the SOP required that explicit runway and intersection identification be used between controllers for these clearances and prohibited the use of generalized instructions for simultaneous runway crossings of multiple aircraft. The phraseology used by LC1 and LC2 controllers in this incident, including “behind the departure” and “one at each,” was inconsistent with this SOP. As a result, LC1’s understanding of the intended sequence differed from LC2’s intent. Specifically, LC1 interpreted the crossing clearance as applicable to the departure preceding SWR17K and initiated runway crossings after that airplane had departed, rather than delaying crossings until SWR17K had passed the applicable intersections as LC2 intended. The absence of precise standard phraseology and the failure to explicitly restate the crossing condition degraded the shared situational awareness between LC1 and LC2, likely leading LC1 to misidentify the aircraft authorized to cross behind traffic. As a result, multiple aircraft were cleared to cross and subsequently occupied runway 4L during SWR17K’s takeoff roll, resulting in a runway incursion and rejected takeoff.

Full narrative

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 17, 2024, about 1646 eastern daylight time (EDT), Swiss Air flight 17K, an Airbus A330-343, was involved in a runway incursion on runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, due to four other aircraft crossing runway 4L. The four crossing aircraft were Delta Air Lines flight 29 (DAL29), a Boeing 767-432(ER), Delta Air Lines flight 420 (DAL420), an Airbus A220-100, Republic Airlines flight 5752 (RPA5752), an Embraer E175LR and America Airlines flight 2246 (AAL2246), a Boeing 737-MAX 8 resulting in Swiss Air flight 17K rejecting their take-off. There was no damage to the aircraft involved nor injuries to crew or passengers. Swiss Air flight 17K (SWR17K) was a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 129 scheduled international passenger flight from JFK to Zurich Airport (ZRH), Zurich, Switzerland. At the time of the runway incursion, the local controller 2 (LC2) was responsible for operations on runway 4L, and the local controller 1 (LC1) was responsible for operations on runway 4R and all the taxiways between runways 4L and 4R. Each controller communicated with assigned aircraft on separate discrete radio frequencies, and coordination between LC1 and LC2 within the tower was conducted verbally rather than over an interphone line. The ground controller (GC) was responsible for taxiways near the terminal area (see figure 1).

Figure 1. A graphic depicting LC1's movement area in blue, LC2's movement area in yellow and GC movement area in green.

The following history of flight was constructed from certified audio recordings and automatic dependent surveillance- broadcast (ADS-B) data provided by the FAA, as well as interview transcripts. All times are in EDT and all speeds are in knots. About 1624, DAL29 checked in with the LC1 controller, was cleared to land on runway 4R, and landed about 1626 before being instructed to taxi via taxiways Y and Z and hold short of taxiway H, while awaiting gate availability. Around the same time, SWR17K began taxiing to runway 4L. At 1638, DAL420 reported established on the ILS for runway 4R, was cleared to land, and touched down about 1640. After DAL29’s gate became available, LC1 instructed them to taxi via taxiway H and hold short of runway 4L. LC1 then issued taxi instructions to DAL420 to turn left on taxiway F, proceed via taxiway Y, and hold short of taxiway G. AAL2246 and RPA5752 were subsequently cleared to land on runway 4R, touching down about 1643 and 1644, respectively. DAL420 later advised their gate was available and was instructed to turn right on taxiway G and hold short of runway 4L. Additional taxi instructions were issued to AAL2246 and RPA5752 to position them clear of runway 4R and short of runway 4L, while LC2 instructed DAL550, an Airbus A321, to line up and wait on runway 4L.

About 2 minutes before the runway incursion DAL29 was holding short of runway 4L at taxiway H. DAL420 was holding short of runway 4L at taxiway G. AAL2246 was taxiing via taxiways FA, Y, YA to hold short of runway 4L, and RPA5752 was taxiing via taxiway F.

At 1644:40, LC2 cleared DAL550 for takeoff from runway 4L. Three seconds later, LC2 instructed SWR17K to line up and wait on runway 4L and subsequently directed LC1 to cross aircraft over runway 4L behind SWR17K at taxiways YA, G, F, and H. The LC1 replied “roger, behind the departure, I’ll go one at each”. At 1645:20, LC1 instructed RPA5752 to remain on taxiway F and hold short of runway 4L. At 1645:41, LC1 instructed DAL29 to cross runway 4L at taxiway H, pass behind the departing aircraft, and taxi via taxiway A to the ramp while monitoring ground control. At 1645:50, LC2 cleared SWR17K for takeoff (see figure 2).

Figure 2. A graphic depicting the locations of DAL29, DAL420, RPA5752, and AAL2246 when SWR17K began their takeoff roll on runway 4L.

At 1645:51, LC1 instructed AAL2246 to cross runway 4L at taxiway YA, and one second later ADSB data indicated DAL550 had crossed at that intersection. At 1645:55, LC2 instructed DAL550 to contact departure while LC1 simultaneously cleared RPA5752 to cross runway 4L at taxiway F. At 1646:00, LC1 cleared DAL420 to cross runway 4L at taxiway G, then taxi via taxiway A and monitor ground control. At 1646:10, airport surveillance detection equipment – model X (ASDEX) data indicated SWR17K began its takeoff roll while four aircraft, all previously cleared to cross runway 4L, were approaching but had not yet entered the runway.

At 1646:15, SWR17K reported rejecting their takeoff due to traffic on the runway. ASDEX data indicated the airplane reached 50 knots and was positioned between taxiways K3 and K4 before rejecting its takeoff. At that time, DAL29, RPA5752, and AAL2246 had entered runway 4L, while DAL420 was approaching the runway edge. DAL29 was at taxiway H traveling at 14 knots, with 4,692 ft of lateral separation from SWR17K (see figure 3).

Figure 3. A screen shot of the ASDE-X replay depicting SWR17K at its peak speed and the distance to DAL29, crossing the runway. (Source: FAA ASDE-X replay analysis) The LC2 controller acknowledged the rejected takeoff and instructed SWR17K to exit onto runway 31L; the crew acknowledged. All runway 4L runway entrance lights (RELs) illuminated at 1646:16 and extinguished at 1646:31. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONAirport Traffic Control (ATC) The airport traffic control tower at JFK airport was 320 ft. high and was a level 11 facility in the FAA Eastern Service area, in the New York District. The control tower faced southeast looking out across Jamaica Bay. On the day of the incident, JFK was in a “North Operation”, meaning they were landing and departing from runway 4L and runway 4R. A diagram of the tower cab layout and the positions that were staffed at the time of the incursion are shown below in figure 5.

Figure 5. Diagram of the JFK tower cab with the positions staffed at the time of the incident. Runway crossing coordination was not accomplished on a recorded line, nor was it required. The LC2 controller reported coordinating with the LC1 controller to cross behind SWR17K. LC2 stated he believed LC1 understood the coordination to direct the four airplanes to cross runway 4L after SWR17K took off from runway 4L based on visual acknowledgment and a verbal “roger.” He also stated he verified runway 4L was clear before issuing the takeoff clearance by scanning the ASDEX display and visually checking the runway.

LC1 stated he heard LC2 issue instructions to cross “behind the departure” at each intersection of runway 4 at taxiways G, H, F, and YA. As an airplane departed runway 4L ahead of SWR17K, LC1 began instructing the airplanes to cross runway 4L. He then heard LC2 clarify, “it was behind Swiss.” Training and Experience of LC2 and LC1 The LC2 controller had been an air traffic controller in the United States Navy before joining the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1997. LC2 controller had been assigned to JFK since 2011. The LC2 controller was certified and current on all control positions at JFK and held a valid medical clearance on the day of the incident, with a limitation to possess vision corrective lenses and use as appropriate for ATC duties. He stated he was wearing corrective lenses at the time of the incident. LC2 had worked the two days before the day of the incident. The LC1 controller has been a controller with the FAA since 2015 and assigned to JFK since 2019. The LC2 controller was certified and current on all controller positions at JFK and held a valid medical clearance on the day of the incident, with a limitation to possess vision corrective lenses and use as appropriate for ATC duties. He stated he was not wearing corrective lenses at the time of the incident and did not need to. LC1 had been off the two days prior to the incident. Airport Surveillance Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X) JFK airport was equipped with an ASDE-X system to alert air traffic controllers of potential runway conflicts by providing detailed coverage of movement on runways and taxiways. Controllers are presented this information on a color display depicting aircraft and vehicle positions as icons overlaid on a map of the airport's runways/taxiways and airport approach corridors. The system continuously updates the map of the airport movement area that controllers can use to enhance their situational awareness. It's particularly beneficial at night or during inclement weather when visibility is poor. The ASDE-X system is also equipped with visual and aural alarms that will alert controllers of possible runway incursions or incidents. The safety logic system is an integral part of the software system for ASDE-X. This software predicts the path of aircraft landing and/or departing, and/or vehicular movements on runways. In addition to the information displayed on the operational ASDE-X displays in the tower, the analysis also provided ground speeds of all aircraft involved in the runway incursion and proximal distance between SWR17K and DAL29 at SWR17K’s highest recorded speed. According to the ASDE-X analysis, SWR17K did not reach the speed that the ASDE-X system logic would classify as being in a takeoff state. Because of this, the ASDE-X system did not alarm and functioned as designed.

Air Traffic Control Procedures JFK 7110.67P Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Chapter 4 - OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR (OS), Section 4-1 RESPONSIBILITES, stated in part: d. When an OS is unavailable, a Controller-in-Charge (CIC) shall be designated and will be responsible for the overall operation of the tower cab during his/her watch. Chapter 8, LOCAL CONTROL, Section 8-5, RUNWAY CROSSINGS, stated in part: b. When Local Control is split and either 4L/R or 22 R/L are in use, requests to cross 4L/22R need not be initiated by LC1, but LC2 must issue approval for LC1 to cross 4L/22R. e. Conditional clearances are authorized between tower positions. The receiving controller should restate the limiting conditions when acknowledging the clearance. PHRASEOLOGY – BEHIND (type aircraft/company) ON SHORT FINAL, CROSS (runway) AT (point/intersection). f. Simultaneous runway crossings at multiple intersections can be authorized. This allows the receiving controller to cross the number of aircraft specified at teach intersection. Do not use phraseology such as “one at each”. PHRASEOLOGY – CROSS RUNWAY (number) WITH (number) AT (state each taxiway).

FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-1-3, Use of Active Runways, stated in part: The local controller has primary responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must control the use of those runways. Positive coordination and control is required as follows: b. When the local controller authorizes another controller to cross an active runway, the local controller must verbally specify the runway to be crossed and the point/intersection at the runway where the operation will occur preceded by the word “cross.”

Probable cause

Nonstandard crossing phraseology and ineffective coordination between local controller 1 (LC1) and local controller 2 (LC2) which resulted in degraded shared situation awareness, and a runway incursion. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident.

Circumstances

Event type
Incident
Weather conditions
Visual Meteorological Cond
Light condition
Day
Sky condition
OVC
Ceiling (ft)
9500
Visibility (sm)
10
Wind direction
100
Wind speed (kt)
13
Temperature (F)
50
Nearest airport
JOHN F KENNEDY INTL
Distance from field
0.0
Airport elevation
13

Aircraft

RegistrationMakeModelDamageFAR part
HB-JHD — — — 129
N104DU C SERIES AIRCRAFT LTD PTNRSP BD-500-1A10 — 121
N838MH BOEING 767-432ER — 121
N210JQ EMBRAER-EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE ERJ 170-200 LR — 121
N342RX — — — 121

Sequence of events

#OccurrencePhase
1 Takeoff-rejected takeoff Runway incursion veh/AC/person defining Takeoff
1 Taxi-from runway Runway incursion veh/AC/person defining Taxi
1 Taxi-from runway Runway incursion veh/AC/person defining Taxi
2 Taxi-from runway Runway incursion veh/AC/person Taxi
1 Taxi-from runway Runway incursion veh/AC/person defining Taxi

Findings

Finding
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Common phraseology-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Interpretation/understanding-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Knowledge-Knowledge of procedures-ATC personnel factor
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Common phraseology-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Interpretation/understanding-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Knowledge-Knowledge of procedures-ATC personnel factor
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Common phraseology-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Interpretation/understanding-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Knowledge-Knowledge of procedures-ATC personnel factor
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Common phraseology-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Interpretation/understanding-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Knowledge-Knowledge of procedures-ATC personnel factor
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Common phraseology-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-Interpretation/understanding-ATC personnel cause
Personnel issues-Experience/knowledge-Knowledge-Knowledge of procedures-ATC personnel factor