N923HA de Havilland DHC-8-102 accident

NTSB BFO92IA017 · 1992-01-12 · BALTIMORE, MD · near BWI

Docket — crew, injuries and powerplant

Factual narrative

AS THE GEAR & FLAPS WERE RETRACTED AFTER TAKEOFF, THE #1 ENGINE LOW FUEL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. AT ABOUT 400' AGL, A "LOUD BANG" WAS HEARD FOLLOWED BY A #1 ENGINE FIRE WARNING INDICATION. THE ENGINE WAS SHUT DOWN & BOTH FIRE EXTINGUISHING BOTTLES WERE DISCHARGED. THE FLIGHTCREW EXTENDED THE LANDING GEAR BY USING THE ALTERNATE SYSTEM & MADE A NO-FLAP EMERGENCY LANDING. THEY USED EMERGENCY BRAKES, BUT DIRECTIONAL CONTROL WAS LOST & THE AIRCRAFT EXITED THE SIDE OF THE RUNWAY & STOPPED WITH THE FIRE EXTINGUISHED. AN EXAM OF THE #1 ENGINE AREA REVEALED A FAILED LOW FUEL PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH SNUBBER & FIRE DAMAGE TO THE ENGINE, NACELLE & WHEELWELL. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT DURING INSTALLATION, THE LOW FUEL PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH SNUBBER WAS TORSIONALLY DEFORMED, THEN FATIGUE & SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OCCURRED. GAPS IN THE FIREWALL ALLOWED LEAKING FUEL (SPRAY) TO ENTER THE HOT SECTION & IGNITE. THIS RESULTED IN AN EXPLOSION & FIRE. FIRE PROPAGATION RESULTED IN BURNED WIRES TO THE #1 STANDBY HYDRAULIC PUMP & A RUPTERED #2 SYSTEM HYDRAULIC LINE.

Probable cause

IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF THE LOW FUEL PRESSURE WARNING SWITCH SNUBBER ON THE #1 ENGINE, RESULTING IN FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE SNUBBER, A FUEL LEAK (SPRAY), AND SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSION/FIRE DAMAGE. A FACTOR RELATED TO THE INCIDENT WAS: INADEQUATE DESIGN OF THE FIREWALL, WHICH ALLOWED FUEL VAPORS TO MIGRATE TO THE HOT SECTION OF THE ENGINE. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident.

Circumstances

Event type
Incident
Highest injury
None
Weather conditions
Visual Meteorological Cond
Light condition
Day
Sky condition
NONE
Ceiling (ft)
0
Visibility (sm)
15
Wind direction
150
Wind speed (kt)
9
Nearest airport
BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTL
Distance from field
0.0
Airport elevation
146

Aircraft

RegistrationMakeModelDamageFAR part
N923HA de Havilland DHC-8-102 MINR 121

Sequence of events

#OccurrencePhase
1 130 Cruise
2 170 Cruise
3 170 Cruise
4 260 Cruise

Findings

Finding
15128 cause
17001 cause
24111 cause
16905
22316
10013 factor
16903 cause
12013
12105
12100
10425
10418
82000 factor
24539